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Abstract: The present article extends a variant of the Obstfeld/Rogoff (2001) two-country DSGE
model by introducing Calvo (1983) pricing. It is possible to collapse the model into a canonical log-
linear representation consisting of two dynamic IS and two New Keynesian Phillips curves. Re°ecting
the di®ering statutes of the ECB and the Fed, two diverging interest-rate rules are introduced. For
a sensible calibration of the model we can derive a locally unique rational expectations equilibrium.
Furthermore, we ¯nd that aggregate productivity shocks, which are assumed to be positively correlated
across countries, have a negative impact on domestic and foreign output, a phenomenon already described
for the closed economy by Gal¶ ³ (2002). Cost-push as well as contractionary monetary policy shocks,
which are assumed to be country-speci¯c, also have a negative impact on domestic and foreign output since
the economies are interdependent due to terms-of-trade externalities. Contrary to Corsetti/Pesenti
(2001), expansionary monetary policy shocks always have a "prosper thyself" and "beggar thy neighbor"
e®ect since they in°uence the terms of trade bene¯cially for the respective country's resident households.
Finally, if the ECB implemented the interest-rate rule proposed in the present article, it would encounter
lower °uctuations in European producer price in°ation compared to an interest-rate rule as proposed
for the Fed. This is consistent with the ECB's paramount objective of price stability. However, this
advantage only holds at the expense of relatively high °uctuations in the European output gap.
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11. Introduction
1. Introduction
If one studies scholarly articles that deal with macroeconomic models of two countries such as, e.g.,
Corsetti/Pesenti (2001), Obstfeld/Rogoff (2001), Clarida et al. (2002), Pappa (2004), or Be-
nigno/Benigno (2006), one usually encounters that the countries' monetary authorities, if explicitly
modeled at all, are modeled as perfectly symmetric institutions.
This gives rise to the question to which extent these models are able to capture real-world features and if
policy recommendations based on these models' results are applicable. The reason why this is questionable
is that, in general, two di®erent central banks might each obey a di®ering and legally binding statute.
Particularly, let us think of the two monetary authorities under examination as the European Central
Bank (ECB) on the one hand and the Federal Reserve System (Fed) on the other.
Article 2 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European
Central Bank (1992, 2004) states the following:2
"In accordance with Article 105(1) of this Treaty, the primary objective of the ESCB shall be
to maintain price stability. Without prejudice to the objective of price stability, it shall support
the general economic policies in the Community with a view to contributing to the achievement
of the objectives of the Community as laid down in Article 2 of this Treaty. The ESCB shall act
in accordance with the principle of an open market economy with free competition, favouring
an e±cient allocation of resources, and in compliance with the principles set out in Article 4
of this Treaty."
However, Section 2a of the Federal Reserve Act (1977, 2000) reads:
"The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Federal Open Market Com-
mittee shall maintain long run growth of the monetary and credit aggregates commensurate
with the economy's long run potential to increase production, so as to promote e®ectively the
goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates."
As one can conclude from these diverging statutes, the paramount objective of the ECB is price stability,
whereas for the Fed this goal is just one out of many. Therefore, in order to model monetary policy of each
central bank consistent with their diverging statutes, one should try and incorporate these institutional
features into their respective policy functions.
The analysis shall be carried out by introducing diverging interest-rate rules into a log-linear representa-
tion of a variant of the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) framework by Obstfeld/Rogoff
(2001), which is extended by Calvo (1983) pricing, a more subtle form of nominal rigidities than the one
used in the original article. The reasoning of some parts of Obstfeld/Rogoff (2001) itself is based on
Corsetti/Pesenti (2001).
At ¯rst sight, the DSGE framework might mislead the reader to the Real Business Cycle (RBC) literature.
Although the structure of the subsequent model is somewhat similar to RBC models, introducing the
assumptions of [1] monopolistic competition on goods markets and [2] some form of nominal rigidity into
the set-up will rebut this preliminary speculation. In contrast to the typical RBC model, monetary policy
will not be neutral in the short run because of these two departing assumptions (see Gal¶ ³ 2008, pp. 4-5).
This is the basic reason why the present model class is usually referred to as "New Keynesian".
The main results of a calibrated version of the model under scrutiny, for which a determinate rational
expectations equilibriums exists, are summarized in the following.
² Simulated aggregate productivity shocks, which are assumed to be positively correlated across coun-
tries, have a negative impact on domestic and foreign output, a result already described for the
closed economy by Gal¶ ³ (2002). The positive correlation of these shocks can be interpreted as
exogenous R&D spill-over e®ects associated with "technology sourcing" as laid out by Griffith et
2More precisely, the responsible body for the monetary policy of the EU is the European System of Central Banks (ESCB),
which comprises the ECB and the national central banks of all 27 EU member states (in 2009).
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al. (2006).
² Simulated cost-push as well as monetary policy shocks, which are assumed to be country-speci¯c,
also have a negative impact on domestic and foreign output since both economies are interdepen-
dent due to terms-of-trade externalities.
² In contrast to Corsetti/Pesenti (2001), expansionary monetary policy shocks always have a
"prosper thyself" and "beggar thy neighbor" e®ect since they in°uence the terms of trade bene¯-
cially for the home (foreign) country's resident households by decreasing them below (raising them
above) their zero-in°ation steady-state value. In addition, this e®ect would induce a rise of both
domestic and foreign output above their °exible-price values.
² If the ECB implemented the interest-rate rule proposed in the present article, it would encounter
lower °uctuations in European producer price in°ation compared to an interest-rate rule as proposed
for the Fed. This is consistent with the ECB's paramount objective of price stability. However, this
advantage only holds at the expense of relatively high °uctuations in the European output gap; a
trade-o® commonly observed in literature on monetary policy.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows: Section 2 gives a short review of current literature
on the topic, Section 3 outlines the basic discrete-time, two-country DSGE model, Section 4 presents
the equilibrium conditions on all markets under °exible prices, Section 5 introduces the New Keynesian
framework, and Section 6 derives a locally unique rational expectations equilibrium for a calibrated
version of the model. The analysis is completed by an impulse-response analysis in Section 7. Finally,
Section 8 concludes. Lengthy derivations are given in respective appendices.
2. Related Literature
In general, the present article can be embedded in the so-called New Open Economy Macroeconomic liter-
ature pioneered by Obstfeld/Rogoff (1995), which has been enriching the traditional Open Economy
Macroeconomic literature by its rigorous microeconomic foundation. There has been done a lot of re-
search on this topic so far and it seems to continue to appeal to a wide range of scholars. There are quite
numerous survey articles and survey book chapters on this issue, e.g., Obstfeld/Rogoff (1996, chapter
10), Lane (2001), Engel (2002), Walsh (2003, chapter 6), or Gal¶ ³ (2008, chapter 7). Of course, this
parsimonious overview remains incomprehensive.
In particular, the present paper deals with a two-country DSGE model such that it is noteworthy to brie°y
summarize the content of similar articles besides Obstfeld/Rogoff (2001) and Corsetti/Pesenti
(2001) such as, e.g., Clarida et al. (2002), Pappa (2004), or Benigno/Benigno (2006).
² Clarida et al. (2002) investigate whether there are gains from cooperation between two monetary
authorities in case of discretionary monetary policy. The authors ¯nd that in case of non-cooperation
the structure of the policy problem is isomorphic to the closed-economy case. Unless there is loga-
rithmic utility of consumption, there are gains from monetary policy cooperation as the optimizing
monetary authorities are willing to internalize possible spill-over e®ects from the terms of trade.
² Pappa (2004) ¯nds that for the case of central banks that are committed to their policy rules there
are no gains from cooperation for the special parameter constellation, for which the cooperative
and non-cooperative regimes coincide, since in this case independent central banks would not face
any spill-over e®ects from the terms of trade. For this parameter constellation a monetary union
is clearly suboptimal as the supranational authority cannot replicate the ¯rst-best allocation when
the nominal exchange rate is ¯xed. For any other parameter constellations, however, there may be
welfare losses from deviating from the cooperation benchmark.
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² Benigno/Benigno (2006) contribute to the literature as they manage to show that it is possible
to design "speci¯c targeting rules" for non-cooperating central banks, which have the property to
assign the incentive to independent central banks to replicate the cooperative allocation such that
possible welfare losses from non-cooperation can be avoided.
There are also numerous articles dealing with small open economy DSGE models such as, e.g., Clarida
et al. (2001) or Gal¶ ³/Monacelli (2005), where the model of the latter coincides with the one discussed
in Gal¶ ³ (2008, chapter 7). Nonetheless, some of their features are useful for two-country frameworks,
too, such that these articles shall also be brie°y summarized.
² Clarida et al. (2001) show that the log-linear representation of a small open economy is isomor-
phic to a closed economy since all structural equations of the small open economy are identical
to their closed-economy counterparts, except that they are related to the terms of trade. As a
result, the policy problem of the small open economy is isomorphic to the policy problem of the
closed economy. Moreover, also the optimal monetary policies under discretion as well as under
commitment are analogous to the closed-economy case, but they a®ect the terms of trade.
² Gal¶ ³/Monacelli (2005) explore the size of welfare losses of suboptimal monetary policies com-
pared to the benchmark case of optimal monetary policy, which is associated with the complete
stabilization of the output gap and producer prices. The suboptimal monetary policies under
scrutiny are a (stylized) producer price in°ation-based Taylor rule, a (stylized) consumer price
in°ation-based Taylor rule and a credible peg of the nominal exchange rate. The authors ¯nd that
the producer price in°ation-based Taylor rule features the lowest welfare losses, followed by the
consumer price in°ation-based Taylor rule and the peg of the nominal exchange rate.
In Gal¶ ³ (2008, chapter 8) one can ¯nd possible extensions to the basic, closed-economy New Keynesian
framework, which might also be intriguing to open economy researchers.
3. New Open Economy Macroeconomic Model
The subsequent model is based on the Obstfeld/Rogoff (2001) two-country DSGE framework, which
extends the basic Obstfeld/Rogoff (1995) model by introducing uncertainty.
3.1. Preferences, Consumption and Price Indexes
Suppose world population is constant over time and consists of a continuum of measure 1 of in¯nitely
lived atomistic households characterized by identical preferences. Assume further perfect information
and rational expectations on part of all agents. There are two countries, where domestic households live
on the segment [0;n] of the unit interval while foreign households live on the remaining segment (n;1].

























The above utility function is a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) composite separable in its ar-
guments real consumption C, real money balances M=P (where P denotes the domestic consumer price
index (CPI)), and leisure ¡L such that the partial derivatives of the utility function with respect to one
variable are independent of all other variables. ¯ denotes an intertemporal discount factor (0 < ¯ < 1).
3Note that a possible superscript i to distinguish individual variables is suppressed throughput the analysis for legibility
reasons.
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Moreover, the following shall hold for the various parameters: Â;° > 0, 0 < ½;" < 1, and » < 0.4
Since (1) is a function in real money balances, the model is a variant of the Sidrauski (1967) and Brock
(1974) money-in-the-utility-function (MIU) models, in which putting real money balances into the utility
function is justi¯ed by assuming that the use of money facilitates transactions. This modeling shortcut
guarantees the usage of money even though holding money per se does not yield a positive real return.5
The utility function of the representative foreign household is the same as (1), except that C¤ may di®er
from C, as well as M¤ from M, P¤ from P, Â¤ from Â, °¤ from °, and L¤ from L.6
Moreover, the total domestic consumption index C from above is de¯ned as a population-weighted per-
capita Cobb-Douglas composite of domestic and foreign commodity bundles, which implicitly assumes






nn(1 ¡ n)1¡n: (2)
The commodity bundles CH and CF are CES composites of di®erentiated ¯nal goods produced at home



























The preference for di®erentiated goods expresses a love of variety on part of the households. As one
can see from (2), the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign commodity bundles ¾CH;CF
equals 1 (Cobb-Douglas speci¯cation). One gets from (3) and (4) that the elasticity of substitution across
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= °L¡» > 0;
@2U
@(¡L)2 = »°L¡»¡1 < 0:
1 minus each of these parameters represents the elasticity of the partial utility function in one of the three arguments,









































1¡»L1¡» = 1 ¡ »:
5Note, however, that some New Open Economy Macroeconomic models abstract from explicitly modeling liquidity services
provided by the use of money (see, e.g., Clarida et al. 2002, p. 882). Note further that domestic households are assumed
to derive utility from holding domestic money only, whereas foreign households are assumed to derive utility from using
foreign money only.
6As one can see here, real foreign variables are denoted by a superscript asterisk. The same holds for nominal foreign
variables in foreign currency, except for nominal internationally traded bonds, which will be discussed in more detail
below.
7Hence, there is no source for the Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson e®ect as described in Obstfeld/Rogoff (1996, pp. 210-216).
Furthermore, the total domestic consumption index (2) is population-weighted for the CPI (5) below to have the usual
form rather than a form such as, e.g., in Clarida et al. (2002, p. 882).
8Alternatively, one could treat imported goods as production factors rather than consumption goods as in McCal-
lum/Nelson (2001). This formulation shall not be adopted, however.
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two individual goods z;z0 produced within a country ¾C(z);C(z0) equals µ (CES speci¯cation, µ > 1 for an
equilibrium to exist).9



























For a derivation of the domestic CPI (5), the domestic PPI for domestic goods (6) as well as the domestic
demand functions for individual and composite domestic goods, which will be introduced below, see
Appendix A.1. The domestic PPI for foreign goods (7), domestic demand curves for individual and
composite foreign goods as well as all foreign indexes can be derived analogously.
Assume that the law of one price holds for consumers across all individual goods at all times:
Pt(z) = StP¤
t (z)8z 2 [0;1]; (8)
where S denotes the endogenously determined nominal exchange rate in price quotation (domestic cur-
rency units in terms of foreign currency units).
Thus, as domestic and foreign households are characterized by identical preferences, the law of one price
implies that absolute purchasing power parity (PPP) always holds for the total CPI, even if relative PPP
(stating that changes in domestic and foreign price levels should be equal in the long run) would be the
more realistic statement (see Obstfeld/Rogoff 1996, pp. 200-202):
Pt = StP¤
t : (9)
The demand functions of the representative domestic household for individual domestic C(h) and foreign

















where z = h 2 [0;n] denotes a typical di®erentiated good z produced at home and z0 = f 2 (n;1] another
typical di®erentiated good z0 produced abroad.
As one can see from equations (10) and (11), demand for individual goods is decreasing in its own price
9
j¾CH;CF j :=
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= µ:
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relative to the respective domestic or foreign PPI.10 Note that µ does not only denote the elasticity of
substitution between any two individual goods, but also the price elasticity of demand for any individual
good faced by each producer.11 Equation (2) implies that the demand curves for the composite domestic













Now we should make use of the fact that world consumption Cw equals the population weighted sum of
total domestic and total foreign consumption, where Cw then denotes per capita as well as total world
consumption as world population is normalized to 1:
Cw
t := nCt + (1 ¡ n)C¤
t : (14)
Combining (14) with equations (8), (10), (11), (12), and (13) one ¯nally obtains the global demand
























The representative domestic household maximizes its objective functional (1) subject to the following
sequence of intertemporal budget constraints (in nominal terms) with respect to the decision variables
Ct, Mt, Bt, and Lt:
WtLt + (1 + it¡1)Bt¡1 + Mt¡1 + ¡t(h) ¸ PtCt + Mt + Bt + Pt¿t: (17)
As an example for a typical °ow budget constraint, inequality (17) states that the household's period
t expenditure must not exceed period t income.13 W denotes the endogenously determined nominal
wage being the remuneration for supplying labor, which is identical across households (L = L(h)) on
the assumed to be perfectly competitive labor market, an assumption di®ering from Clarida et al.
(2002). it¡1 denotes the nominal interest rate between period t ¡ 1 and period t on riskless one-period
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domestic currency and are supposed to be internationally tradable.14
Money holdings Mt¡1 can also be transferred from t ¡ 1 to t but yield no nominal return. Consumption
goods, however, are perishable and cannot be stored. ¡t(h) are instantaneous pro¯ts of the representative
household acting as a producer of an individual, di®erentiated domestic good h, which will be explained
in more detail below. Finally, let ¿ denote non-distortionary real lump-sum taxes.
Again, for the representative foreign household the intertemporal budget constraint is the same as (17).
Since internationally traded bonds are supposed to be denominated in domestic currency, foreign bond
holdings in domestic currency B¤ ¯rst have to be divided by the nominal exchange rate before they enter
the foreign intertemporal budget constraint: B¤=S. Moreover, W¤ may di®er from W, i¤ from i, ¡¤(f)
from ¡(h), as well as ¿¤ from ¿.
The maximization of the utility function (1) subject to the budget constraint (17) then holding with
equality is undertaken by maximizing the corresponding Lagrangian and yields the subsequent ¯rst order













This is the intertemporal Euler equation for total real consumption stating that the marginal rate of
substitution between total real consumption in t and in t + 1 equals their discounted relative prices.
Moreover, one obtains that in a utility maximum the marginal rate of substitution between real money
























where one can see that the higher total real consumption, the higher is demand for real money balances.












which states that the marginal rate of substitution between labor and total real consumption equals their
relative prices, the real consumer wage. For a derivation of conditions (18), (19), and (20) see Appendix
A.2.
Note that analogous equations to (18), (19), and (20) also hold abroad.
3.3. Firms
Let us assume further that agents at home and abroad do not only act as utility maximizing households,
but also as pro¯t maximizing ¯rms of ¯nal goods, which shall be producible without the input of inter-
mediate goods. In contrast to their role as households whose preferences are assumed to be identical, all
commodities are di®erentiated goods satisfying the households' love of variety.
Hence, there is the possibility to raise individual goods' prices, P(h);P(f), above marginal cost without
14Note that one could generalize this formulation by assuming that domestic and foreign households had access to a complete
portfolio of state-contingent Arrow-Debreu securities, both domestically and internationally tradable, as in Clarida et
al. (2002) in order to guarantee for the completeness of (international) ¯nancial markets.
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the risk of dropping out of the market. In other words, non-zero pro¯ts are feasible in this model of
monopolistic competition.
Let individual domestic output be produced according to the following linear production function:
Yt(h) = AtLt(h): (21)
This is a production function in labor only. For the sake of simplicity, real capital shall be omitted as
additional input factor throughout the analysis. This step can be justi¯ed by the short- to medium-run
perspective of the model. A shall be a random variable denoting an exogenous aggregate productivity
shock, interpretable as a transitory process innovation. This productivity shock shall be positively cor-
related with its foreign equivalent A¤, whereby the positive correlation may be interpreted as exogenous
R&D spill-over e®ects associated with "technology sourcing" as described in Griffith et al. (2006, pp.
1859-1861). In the present set-up, technology sourcing would then have a mutual nature.
Households need not be self-employed, but it is assumed that domestic ¯rms can employ domestic labor
only as well as foreign ¯rms shall be allowed to employ foreign labor only. In other words, there is no
migration in this world.
Individual foreign output is produced using the same technology (21) as at home. Nonetheless, Y ¤(f)
may di®er from Y (h), A¤ from A, as well as L¤(f) from L(h).
Producers' instantaneous pro¯ts ¡t(h), which have already been introduced above, are then given by:
¡t(h) = Pt(h)Yt(h) ¡ WtLt(h): (22)











= Yt(h) ¡ ·tYt(h); (23)
where one has made use of the production function (21). In (23) · := W=[P(h)A] is de¯ned as individual
real marginal production cost.
For now assume all goods prices to be °exible. Then each domestic producer charges the same price
denoted by the domestic PPI (PH = P(h)). Thus, instantaneous pro¯ts rearrange to:
¡t(h) = Pt;HYt(h) ¡ WtLt(h): (24)
Maximizing equation (24) with respect to Y (h) and using the fact that in case of goods market clearing
output of a single producer equals global demand for the di®erentiated good (Y (h) = Cw(h)), we get the
standard ¯rst order condition for a pro¯t maximum in a model of monopolistic competition:
@¡t(h)
@Yt(h)


































Note that an analogous equation to (25) also holds abroad and that ·flex = (·¤)flex = (µ ¡ 1)=µ.
Equation (25) states that in a pro¯t maximum associated with °exible prices, the corresponding real
marginal production cost de¯ned as ·flex equals (µ ¡ 1)=µ.15
15Note that if one solved equation (25) for PH, one would obtain the domestic PPI as a mark-up on marginal unit labor
costs W=A: PH = [µ=(µ ¡ 1)]W=A with µ=(µ ¡ 1) = 1=·flex denoting the °exible-price mark-up factor.
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4. Market Clearing under Flexible Prices
Before introducing nominal rigidities in Section 5, one should ¯rst consider the benchmark case of market
equilibria in a world with completely °exible prices.
4.1. World Bond and Goods Markets
For the derivation of the subsequent equations and their relation to one another see Appendix A.3.







where the left-hand side of equation (26) denotes global supply of and the right-hand side global demand
for domestic goods.
Note that an analogous interpretation for (27) also holds abroad.













which is the ratio of imported goods' and exported goods' prices from the home country's perspective.
Using the domestic intertemporal budget constraint (17) plus further manipulations eventually yield the
domestic and foreign balance of payment identities:







with the left-hand side of equation (29) representing the home country's current account and the right-
hand side its capital account.
Note that an analogous interpretation for (30) also holds abroad.
Internationally tradable bonds are supposed to be in zero net world supply:
nBt + (1 ¡ n)B¤
t = 0: (31)
Assuming that international bond holdings have initially been zero B0 = B¤
0 = 0 together with (14),
(29), (30), and (31) implies that Bt = B¤
t = 0 at all times according to Corsetti/Pesenti (2001, pp.
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These are the conditions for domestic and foreign goods market clearing, which imply that households
across countries always consume exactly their real incomes (see Obstfeld/Rogoff 2001, p. 8).
Moreover, B0 = B¤






t = nCt + (1 ¡ n)C¤
t = nT
n¡1
t Yt + (1 ¡ n)Tn
t Y ¤
t = Y n
t (Y ¤
t )1¡n;
while making use of (34) and (35).
In consequence, consumption shares across countries are not only time-constant but even equal (see
Obstfeld/Rogoff 2001, p. 8). Since current and capital accounts between the two countries are in
balance at all times and in all possible states of the world, the mechanism of adjustment to shocks in the
world economy will only be represented by movements in the TOT, but not by changes in the countries'
net asset positions. Hence, international ¯nancial markets are redundant anyway such that explicitly
modeling ¯nancial market completeness by introducing Arrow-Debreu securities can be waived.
4.2. National Money Markets and World Currency Market
The government is assumed to set its expenditures equal to its revenues at all times such that the
government budget is always in balance and no seignorage can occur (see Obstfeld/Rogoff 1996, p.
523):16
Mt ¡ Mt¡1 + Pt¿t = 0: (36)
Note that an analogous equation to (36) also holds abroad.
Equation (36) describes domestic money supply. Combining (36) with (19) and using the condition
for domestic goods market clearing (34), one obtains two equations in M, which can be set equal and

















Making use of (9), an analogous equation in P can be computed abroad such that both equations can







































As one can see from the above formula, the current equilibrium nominal exchange rate St positively
depends on past domestic nominal money balances Mt¡1, current domestic opportunity costs of holding
money it=(1 + it), current foreign output Y ¤
t , and current foreign real lump-sum taxes ¿¤
t . The depen-
dence on the remaining variables is of opposite sign, except for the current TOT Tt, whose in°uence
is ambiguous. An increase of S illustrates a depreciation of the domestic currency, whereas a decrease
characterizes an appreciation.
16One could extend the model by introducing government spending (shocks) (see Obstfeld/Rogoff 2001, pp. 37-38),
which shall be waived for this analysis however.
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4.3. National Labor Markets
Notice from equations (20) and (25) that the real wage di®ers between consumers and producers because
they use di®erent price indexes. The ratio between real producer and real consumer wage is known as




F = (PH=PF)1¡n = Tn¡1 in the present set-up.
Nonetheless, by combining (20), (25), and (34) with the CPI (5) one obtains two equations in W=P =


















Equation (37) states that in an equilibrium on the perfectly competitive labor market, domestic employ-
ment positively depends on the aggregate productivity shock A and °exible-price real marginal production
cost (µ ¡ 1)=µ, but negatively on the TOT T and domestic output Y .
Note that an analogous equation to (37) also holds abroad.
Combining equation (37) with the production function (21) and solving for Y , one ¯nally obtains the


















The domestic °exible-price equilibrium output positively depends on the aggregate productivity shock
A, yet negatively on the TOT T and the °exible-price mark-up factor µ=(µ ¡ 1).
Note that an analogous equation to (38) also holds abroad.
5. New Keynesian Framework
After having drawn the DSGE set-up and derived optimality conditions for both households and ¯rms
(Section 3) as well as market clearing conditions under °exible prices (Section 4), let us now turn to the
New Keynesian framework. In order to establish such a framework, one has to introduce some form of
nominal rigidity in addition to the assumption of monopolistic competition. In the present case, we will
concentrate on sticky prices and forego sticky nominal wages as done, for instance, by Corsetti/Pesenti
(2001).
Log-linearizing the alternative market clearing and optimality conditions in the neighborhood of a non-
stochastic zero-in°ation steady state will lead to a canonical representation of the equilibrium of the model
consisting of a dynamic IS curve, a New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC), and some form of monetary
policy rule, both at home and abroad, as well as an equation for the TOT. This makes it possible for
the fully micro-founded New Open Economy Macroeconomic literature to tie in with traditional Open
Economy Macroeconomic models of the Mundell-Fleming-Dornbusch type.
As there are two countries, altogether we will obtain a system of seven log-linear equations. This form
makes the model analytically tractable, especially for empirical applications: Leith/Malley (2007), e.g.,
estimate NKPCs for the G7 economies by using the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator
based on log-linear equations. Rumler (2007) applies a similar approach for the Euro area countries.17
Finally, the monetary policy rules which will be introduced below shall be di®erent across countries. This
is one of the crucial assumptions of this article.
17In contrast to Corsetti/Pesenti (2001) who present a closed-form solution of their (deterministic) model, the log-linear
approximation used here is considered to be advantageous since the link to empirical applications is immediate.
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5.1. Dynamic IS Curves
It is straightforward to derive the dynamic IS curves for both countries by log-linearizing the domestic
intertemporal Euler equation for real consumption (18) and its foreign analog around the non-stochastic
zero-in°ation steady state as shown in Appendix A.4. Accordingly, one obtains:18
^ yt = Et[^ yt+1] +
1
½
fEt[¼t+1] ¡^ itg ¡ (1 ¡ n)Et[¢tt+1]; (39)
^ y¤






tg + nEt[¢tt+1]: (40)
These two dynamic IS curves represent aggregate demand in both countries, where (39) can be interpreted
as follows: current domestic demand is higher than its zero-in°ation steady-state value if the expected
domestic output deviation Et[^ yt+1] is positive (interpretable as an expected boom at home). There is also
a clear positive relation of current demand to expected CPI in°ation Et[¼t+1] (households consume more
today if prices are expected to augment in the future) and a negative relation to current deviations from
the zero-in°ation steady-state nominal interest rate ^ it (investing in nominal bonds is relatively attractive
compared to buying consumption goods).
Moreover, there are also spill-over e®ects from abroad, which a®ect current domestic demand through
expected movements in the TOT Et[¢tt+1]: current domestic demand negatively depends on an expected
increase in the TOT since TOT expected to augment mean that imported goods become more expensive
relative to domestic goods.19 1 ¡ n denotes the degree of openness of the home country to the foreign
country (see Gal¶ ³ 2008, pp. 155-156). Since the degree of openness coincides with the size of the foreign
country due the de¯nition of the domestic CPI (2), there is no home bias in consumption, di®erent to
what is discussed in Pappa (2004, pp. 770-771).
Note that an analogous interpretation for (40) also holds abroad.
It may also be useful to introduce the domestic real interest rate r, which can be obtained via the Fisher
relation:




whose log-linear version reads
it ´ Et[¼t+1] + rt: (41)
Note that an analogous equation to (41) also holds for the foreign real interest rate r¤.
Note further that ¹ i = ¹ i¤ = ¹ r = ¹ r¤ = (1 ¡ ¯)=¯ denotes the zero-in°ation steady-state nominal and
real interest rates, both at home and abroad, which can easily be obtained by solving the zero-in°ation
steady-state version of the domestic intertemporal Euler equation for real consumption (18) and its foreign




t+1] = ¹ C¡½;Pt = Et[Pt+1] = ¹ P).
5.2. New Keynesian Phillips Curves
The NKPCs for both countries can be derived by log-linearizing the price-setting equations of domestic
and foreign ¯rms around the non-stochastic zero-in°ation steady-state as shown in Appendix A.5. In
order to obtain the short-run "trade-o®" between PPI in°ation and the output gap represented by a
18Note that except for all types of interest rates, lower-case Latin letters denote natural logarithms of the corresponding
variables. The hats above these log variables signify, except for all types of interest rates, percentage deviations from
their zero-in°ation steady-state values. In case of any interest rate these hats denote deviations measured in percentage
points. The zero-in°ation steady-state values themselves are denoted by upper bars.
19The TOT are expected to increase over time if either the domestic currency is expected to depreciate or if expected
foreign PPI in°ation will be higher than expected domestic PPI in°ation, where these rates of in°ation will be discussed
below in more detail.
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Phillips curve it is necessary to assure for price stickiness in addition to monopolistic competition. This
shall be done by introducing Calvo (1983) contracts, which means that each producer is only allowed
to reset her price with probability 1 ¡ ± in any given period, independent of the time since the last
adjustment. Therefore, a measure of 1 ¡ ± of ¯rms reset theirs prices each period, while a measure of ±
of ¯rms keep their prices constant and simply adjust their individual output in order to meet demand.
1=(1 ¡ ±) then captures the average duration of a price (see Gal¶ ³ 2008, p. 43):
¼t;H = ¯Et[¼t+1;H] +






(1 ¡ ±¤)(1 ¡ ±¤¯)
±¤ ^ ·¤
t: (43)
In equation (42) ¼t;H := ^ pt;H ¡ ^ pt¡1;H is de¯ned as current domestic PPI in°ation, which typically
di®ers from domestic CPI in°ation. The NKPC (42) states that current domestic PPI in°ation ¼t;H is
an increasing function of both expected domestic PPI in°ation Et[¼t+1;H] and the deviation of current
domestic real marginal production cost from its zero-in°ation steady-state value ^ ·t := ·t ¡ ·
flex
t .
Note that an analogous interpretation for (43) also holds abroad. However, ±¤ is assumed to di®er from
± and ·¤ also from ·, although ·flex = (·¤)flex = (µ ¡ 1)=µ. Furthermore, let us assume that "setting a
new price at home" and "setting a new price abroad" are stochastically independent events. As domestic
and foreign ¯rms both set theirs prices in the currency of the countries where they are located, the
present model features producer-currency pricing, which is one of the possible occurrences of pricing to
market.20
Nonetheless, it would be desirable to express equations (39), (40), (42), and (43) in terms of the output
gap, which shall be de¯ned as the di®erence between the sticky-price and the °exible-price output devi-
ations: xt := ^ yt ¡ ^ y
flex
t and x¤
t := ^ y¤
t ¡ (^ y¤
t)flex. If we want to implement this we have to investigate the



















Combining equation (44) with the labor supply curve (20), the production function (21), and the condition




































t denotes the domestic °exible-price equilibrium output as given by equation (38). Log-
linearizing this expression around the zero-in°ation steady-state yields:
^ ·t = (½ ¡ »)(^ yt ¡ ^ y
flex
t ) = (½ ¡ »)xt: (46)
Hence, by using (46) equations (39), (40), (42), and (43) rearrange to:
xt = Et[xt+1] +
1
½
fEt[¼t+1] ¡^ itg ¡ (1 ¡ n)Et[¢tt+1] + Et[^ y
flex










tg + nEt[¢tt+1] + Et[(^ y¤
t+1)flex] ¡ (^ y¤
t)flex; (48)






20This speci¯cation has already been adopted in the theoretical literature (see, e.g., Clarida et al. 2002, p. 885) and can
also be justi¯ed by empirical evidence for most of the G7 countries (see Leith/Malley 2007, p. 420).
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with ¹ := [(1¡±)(1¡±¯)(½¡»)]=± (¹ > 0) and ¹¤ := [(1¡±¤)(1¡±¤¯)(½¡»)]=±¤ (¹¤ > 0) representing the
slope coe±cients of the NKPCs with respect to the domestic (foreign) output gap. In addition, ut shall
denote an exogenously given, stationary AR(1) process of the form ut = ³uut¡1 + ´u;t (0 < ³u < 1) with
the exogenous error term ´u assumed to be i.i.d. » N(0;¾2
´u). This AR(1) process can be interpreted as
a transitory cost-push shock re°ecting determinants of real marginal production cost which do not move
proportionally with the output gap (see Clarida et al. 2001, pp. 250-251).
The two NKPCs represent aggregate supply in both countries and are isomorphic to their closed-economy
counterparts, where (49) can be interpreted as follows: the positive short-run "trade-o®" between current
domestic PPI in°ation ¼t;H and the current domestic output gap xt can easily be seen.21 However, this
is not really a trade-o® to be exploited since ¼t;H is also positively related to (discounted) expected
domestic PPI in°ation ¯Et[¼t+1;H].22
Note that an analogous interpretation for (50) also holds abroad. However, u¤ shall be uncorrelated with
u such that domestic and foreign cost-push shocks are country-speci¯c.
It will turn out to be convenient that the following holds for Et[^ y
flex
t+1 ] ¡ ^ y
flex
t in case one makes use of






















































where at is assumed to obey an exogenously given, stationary random process of the form at = ³aat¡1 +
'aa¤
t + ´a;t (0 < ³a;'a < 1) with the exogenous error term ´a assumed to be i.i.d. » N(0;¾2
´a).
Note that an analogous equation to (51) also holds abroad.
In consequence, the dynamic IS curves (47) and (48) rearrange to:
xt = Et[xt+1] +
1
½
fEt[¼t+1] ¡^ itg +





















It would also be preferable to express these dynamic IS curves in terms of PPI rather than CPI in°ation,
which can be achieved by using the subsequent log-linear representation of the TOT (28): tt := st +
p¤
t;F ¡ pt;H. Subtracting this expression from its expected analog one gets: Et[¢tt+1] = Et[¢st+1] +
Et[¼¤
t+1;F] ¡ Et[¼t+1;H] = Et[¼t+1;F] ¡ Et[¼t+1;H]. Combining this outcome with the log-linear versions
of the domestic CPI (5) and its foreign equivalent, one obtains the following relations between expected
CPI and expected PPI in°ation at home and abroad:
Et[¼t+1] ´ Et[¼t+1;H] ¡ (n ¡ 1)Et[¢tt+1]; (54)
Et[¼¤
t+1] ´ Et[¼¤
t+1;F] ¡ nEt[¢tt+1]: (55)
21Note that NKPCs such as (49) and (50) in terms of the output gap sometimes are referred to as aggregate supply (AS)
curves (see Clarida et al. 2001, p. 250).
22If, for instance, some institution had the power to raise domestic output above its °exible-price value (given the deviations
from its zero-in°ation steady-state value) by raising ¼t;H, not only ¼t;H but also ¯Et[¼t+1;H] would have to rise for
(49) to hold with equality. This means that if output were kept on this arti¯cially high level for an extended period of
time, the respective expected in°ation rates would continue to rise at accelerating speed (acceleration theorem).
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Substituting for Et[¼t+1] by (54) and for Et[¼¤
t+1] by (55), the dynamic IS curves (52) and (53) change
to the following:
xt = Et[xt+1] +
1
½
















where # := [(n ¡ 1)(»½ ¡ »)]=[(» ¡ ½)½] (# > 0) and #¤ := [n(»½ ¡ »)]=[(» ¡ ½)½] (#¤ < 0) holds for the
slope coe±cients of the dynamic IS curves with respect to the expected movements in the TOT.
Therefore, we need an equation that expresses these movements as a function of the remaining endogenous
variables. In order to do so, let us introduce uncovered interest rate parity as condition for avoiding
currency arbitrage:





where its log-linear version reads
it ´ Et[¢st+1] + i¤
t: (58)
By solving the period t¡1 equivalent of equation (58) for Et¡1[¢st] = ¢st (assuming that past expecta-
tions have been correct) and plugging the result into the log-linear representation of current movements
in the TOT ¢tt = ¢st + ¼¤
t;F ¡ ¼t;H one obtains:
¢tt =^ it¡1 ¡^ i¤
t¡1 + ¼¤
t;F ¡ ¼t;H: (59)
5.3. Monetary Policy Rules
With the derivation of equations (49), (50), (56), (57), and (59) one has obtained a system of ¯ve log-
linear expectational di®erence equations. However, with x;x¤;¼H;¼¤
F;¢t;^ i;^ i¤ one has seven endogenous
variables, two more variables than equations. Therefore, we need two more equations which represent
domestic and foreign monetary policy as Taylor (1993) type interest-rate rules in order to obtain a
determined system of equations. Following Woodford (2003, pp. 90-101), these interest-rate rules shall
comprise a feedback from (some of) the endogenous variables. There, those interest-rate rules are ¯rst
incorporated into a Neo-Wicksellian cashless economy, but Woodford (2003, pp. 101-106) also shows
that rules of this form produce equivalent results in case of monetary frictions, e.g., in the MIU model
given by equation (1). Even though the Woodford (2003) results have been derived for the closed
economy, they are supposed to hold for the open economy, too, which is due to the isomorphism of the
models.
The feedback is introduced to circumvent price level (and in°ation) indeterminacy as shown by Sar-
gent/Wallace (1975), which is typically associated with purely exogenous interest-rate targets (see
Woodford 2003, p. 86). In case the latter type of modeling is avoided, the monetary aggregate is not
a superior policy instrument compared to the short-run nominal interest rate. Moreover, it is assumed
that the central banks are committed to their rules rather than they implement new "rules" on a period-
by-period basis. This is done in order to overcome time inconsistency of monetary policy. For a debate
on discretion versus commitment in monetary policy and possible welfare gains from the latter see, e.g.,
Clarida et al. (1999, pp. 1670-1671) or Gal¶ ³ (2008, chapter 5).
Hereinafter, the two monetary authorities shall be called ECB at home and Fed abroad as already fore-
shadowed in the introductory Section 1. In consequence, the home "country" will be denoted European
Union (EU) and the foreign country United States (US).
These two central banks shall be assumed to conduct their monetary policies autonomously, which means
that they take as given the policy actions of the respective other monetary authority. In other words,
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the two central banks are assumed to be non-cooperating. This assumption di®ers, for instance, from
Clarida et al. (2002), Pappa (2004), or Benigno/Benigno (2006) who consider cooperative equilibria
among other possibilities. A particular reason why cooperative solutions can be ignored is the ¯nding
that there are only quantitatively negligible welfare gains from cooperation between the ECB and the
Fed for empirically plausible parameter constellations (see Pappa 2004, pp. 770-774).
Even though the central banks' targeting rules ful¯ll a similar purpose in the EU and the US, it can be
justi¯ed to assume that they di®er to a certain extent. This is due to the diverging statutes of the ECB
and the Fed, which have also been stated in the introductory Section 1.
Therefore, the interest rate rules shall di®er such that the Fed is supposed to conduct its monetary policy
by considering current US PPI in°ation ¼¤
t;F and the current US output gap x¤
t, while, for the sake
of simplicity, the ECB is supposed to impose its monetary policy taking into account current EU PPI
in°ation ¼t;H only. This di®erence is due to the fact that all conceivable policy goals of the ECB besides
price stability can be interpreted as secondary.
Hence, the two interest-rate rules read:
^ it = ®¼t;H + !^ it¡1 + vt (60)










t + !¤it¡1 + (1 ¡ !¤)¹ i¤ + v¤
t:
The ECB's interest rate rule (60) can be interpreted as follows: ® (® > 0) denotes the sensitivity of the
ECB to current domestic PPI in°ation ¼t;H. Since past decisions cannot be ignored under commitment
(see Pappa 2004, p. 754), the rule incorporates some degree of inertia of the monetary policy instrument
i itself as in Woodford (2003, pp. 95-96), which is measured by the parameter ! (0 < ! < 1). The
parameter 1 ¡ !, however, measures the degree of adjustment to the zero-in°ation steady-state value of
the nominal interest rate ¹ i.23
In (60), vt shall denote an exogenously given, stationary AR(1) process of the form vt = ³vvt¡1 + ´v;t
(0 < ³v < 1) with the exogenous error term ´v assumed to be i.i.d. » N(0;¾2
´v). This AR(1) process can
be interpreted as a transitory monetary policy shock, where a positive realization of ´v would denote a
contractionary shock (see Gal¶ ³ 2008, p. 51).
Note that an analogous interpretation for (61) also holds for the US. However, ®¤ may di®er from ® as
well as !¤ from !. Moreover, v¤ shall be uncorrelated with v such that domestic and foreign monetary
policy shocks are country-speci¯c. ¶¤ (¶¤ > 0) denotes the sensitivity of the Fed to the current foreign
output gap x¤
t.24 Since the signs of the elasticities of the central banks' policy instruments to endogenous
variables are all positive so that they react anti-cyclically to their changes, the policies could alternatively
be characterized to have a "lean against the wind" property as in Clarida et al. (1999, p. 1672).
Altogether, (49), (50), (56), (57), (59), (60) and (61) form a determined system of six log-linear expecta-
tional di®erence equations.
6. Determinacy of the Rational Expectations Equilibrium
In order to investigate whether there is a determinate rational expectations equilibrium to the system
of expectational di®erence equations (49), (50), (56), (57), (59), (60) and (61) it is advantageous to
rearrange it in matrix form.
23Following Gal¶ ³/Monacelli (2005, p. 723), both rules (60) and (61) could also be denoted PPI (or domestic) in°ation-
based Taylor rules (DITR) as opposed to CPI in°ation-based Taylor rules (CITR) or a credible peg for the nominal
exchange rate. However, we will not take up these other possibilities of monetary policy design here.
24Note that ¶ = 0 is assumed to hold for the ECB.
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In consequence, we obtain the subsequent matrix form for the system of equations:
Ay = Bx + u; (62)


































































































1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0
¡¹ 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 ¡¹¤ 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 ¡1 1 ¡1 1
0 0 ®






























1 0 ½¡1 0 # ¡½¡1 0
0 1 0 ½¡1 #¤ 0 ¡½¡1
0 0 ¯ 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 ¯ 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 !¡1 0














In order to determine the eigenvalues of the system of equations (62), it has to be rearranged in the
following form:
y = Mx + v; (63)
where M := A¡1B and v := A¡1u. Moreover, A¡1 denotes the inverse of A, which exists because
det(A) = 1 6= 0.
The matrices A¡1 and M and the vector v read as follows:
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where det(M) = 0.
The impact of the single disturbances contained in v on the structural equations of the model can be
characterized as follows. The positively correlated aggregate productivity shocks Et[¢at+1];Et[¢a¤
t+1]
a®ect the respective dynamic IS curves, NKPCs, and interest rate rules. The country-speci¯c cost-push
shocks u;u¤, however, only in°uence the respective NKPCs and interest-rate rules. The country-speci¯c
monetary policy shocks v;v¤ have a sole impact on the respective interest-rate rules. All macroeconomic
shocks spill over abroad since they explicitly a®ect the TOT equation (59). In addition, there is an
implicit spill-over e®ect due to the positive correlation of the aggregate productivity shocks.
6.1. General Case
The system of equations (63) consists of two predetermined variables (^ it¡1;^ i¤
t¡1) and ¯ve non predeter-
mined ones (xt;x¤
t;¼t;H;¼¤
t;F;¢tt). Comparable to the case discussed for the closed economy in Gal¶ ³
(2008, p. 56), there is a unique stationary solution of (63) if and only if the coe±cient matrix M has
¯ve eigenvalues k inside and two eigenvalues k on or outside the complex unit circle (su±cient condition
for equilibrium determinacy). If there were more than ¯ve stable eigenvalues, there would be multiple
stationary solutions. If there were more than two instable eigenvalues instead, no stationary solution
would exist at all.
By computing the characteristic determinant det(M ¡ kI7) one obtains one eigenvalue k1 = 0 and a
sixth-degree polynomial in k, which cannot be solved analytically. This polynomial is not displayed here,
but its Matlab code is available on request.
In consequence, we have to assign sensible numerical values to the model parameters in order to determine
the remaining eigenvalues of M.
6.2. Calibration
The numerical exercise is carried out as follows, whereby the length of one period shall correspond to one
quarter of a year. First, the EU and the US can be treated as approximately equal-sized countries such
that n = 1 ¡ n = 0:5. ¯ = 0:97 is assumed to hold for the intertemporal discount factor, which implies
¹ i = ¹ i¤ = ¹ r = ¹ r¤ = (1¡¯)=¯ ¼ 0:03 for the zero-in°ation steady-state nominal and real interest rates across
countries. Furthermore, » = ¡1 such that ²UL;L = ²U¤
L;L¤ = 2 holds for the partial elasticity of the utility
function with respect to domestic (foreign) labor. The sensitivity of the Fed to the current foreign output
gap shall be ¯xed (¶¤ = 0:5), where this number corresponds to the original value estimated by Taylor
(1993) for the Fed for the time from 1987 to 1992. The Taylor principle, which states that the monetary
authority ought to react to an increase in current PPI in°ation by augmenting its policy instrument more
than one for one in order to account for a determinate rational expectations equilibrium (see Woodford
2003, p. 40), shall be ful¯lled by both central banks (® = ®¤ = 1:5).25 The degrees of nominal interest-
rate inertia across countries shall also be ¯xed (! = !¤ = 0:1) implying that both monetary authorities
are supposed to place relatively more weight (1¡! = 1¡!¤ = 0:9) on the adjustment of their short-run
policy instruments to their zero-in°ation steady-state value.
Moreover, set ½ = 0:8 such that one gets the following for the slope coe±cients #;#¤ of the dynamic IS
25Note that the Taylor principle in its purest form is not a necessary condition for equilibrium determinacy for an interest-
rate rule of type (61). Instead, the condition ¹¤(®¤ ¡ 1) + (1 ¡ ¯)¶¤ > 0 is a necessary and su±cient condition for
equilibrium determinacy in case of contemporaneous data (see, e.g., Bullard/Mitra 2002, pp. 1125-1126).
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curves (56) and (57) with respect to expected movements in the TOT:26
# =







Set the degree of price stickiness to ± = ±¤ = 0:75 across countries, which corresponds to an average
duration of a price of 4 quarters. This implies the following for the slope coe±cients ¹;¹¤ of the NKPCs
(49) and (50) with respect to the domestic (foreign) output gap:
¹ = ¹¤ =
(1 ¡ 0:75)(1 ¡ 0:75x0:97)[0:8 ¡ (¡1)]
0:75
¼ 0:16:
Calculating the characteristic determinant det(M ¡ kI7) while using the above parameter con¯guration
then yields the subsequent numerical eigenvalues:
k1 = 0;
k2 = 0:5441;
k3 = 0:8176 + 0:2411i;




Since M contains ¯ve stable (k1 to k5) and two unstable eigenvalues (k6 and k7), there is a unique
stationary solution to the system of equations (63) such that the rational expectations equilibrium indeed
is determinate.
Notice that the above results have been derived for a calibrated version of the two-country DSGE model
only so that they may not necessarily be universally applicable.
7. Impulse-Response Analysis
After having assured for determinacy of the rational expectations equilibrium, it would be interesting to
investigate how the endogenous variables of the model react to simulated transitory shocks at home and
abroad. This impulse-response analysis can also be viewed as additional robustness test for the goodness
of the present model speci¯cation.
For this purpose, let us assume the following autocorrelation coe±cients of the domestic and foreign
productivity, cost-push, and monetary policy shocks: ³a = ³¤
a = ³u = ³¤
u = ³v = ³¤
v = 0:8.27 Moreover,
'a = '¤
a = 0:3 shall be proposed for the correlation coe±cients of the interdependent productivity
shocks.
Using the above speci¯cation and starting from the non-stochastic zero-in°ation steady state, we entail
26Note that if we examined the special case of ½ = 1, which corresponds to logarithmic utility of consumption, we would
get three implications for the dynamic IS curves (56) and (57): [1] the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of real
consumption 1=½ is equal to 1 across countries, [2] the impact of the TOT vanishes since # = #¤ = 0, and [3] the
coe±cients on the aggregate productivity shocks Et[¢at+1];Et[¢a¤
t+1] simplify to 1. Hence, the dynamic IS curves
would be isomorphic to their closed-economy counterparts. Let us remind the reader at this point that even though the
TOT e®ects would disappear for this case, the two economies would remain interdependent because of the positively
correlated aggregate productivity shocks Et[¢at+1];Et[¢a¤
t+1].
27We propose this relatively high serial correlation of the transitory shock variables mainly for illustrative reasons. Quali-
tatively, we would obtain the same results if we used smaller autocorrelation coe±cients.
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impulses in period 1 on the exogenous error terms ´a;´¤
a;´u;´¤
u;´v;´¤
v in terms of one standard deviation
of +
p
0:4 on their expected value of 0. The impulse-response analysis is carried out by employing the
Dynare package for Matlab while simulating over 2100 periods.28 For the Dynare program code see
Appendix A.6.
The six ¯gures below show the responses of the output gaps x;x¤, PPI in°ation rates ¼H;¼¤
F, movements
in the TOT ¢t, nominal interest rates^ i;^ i¤, and the relevant shock variables themselves to (orthogonalized)
impulses on the various exogenous error terms for a time range of 40 periods or 10 years.29
































































Figure 1: Responses to an impulse on the domestic productivity shock
28The software is downloadable from http://www.cepremap.cnrs.fr/dynare/. For all computations associated with the
impulse-response analysis it uses the pure perturbation algorithm developed by Schmitt-Groh¶ e/Uribe (2004, pp.
764-765) as its default option.
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0 0 0 0 ¾2
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Figure 2: Responses to an impulse on the foreign productivity shock




















































Figure 3: Responses to an impulse on the domestic cost-push shock
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Figure 4: Responses to an impulse on the foreign cost-push shock



















































Figure 5: Responses to an impulse on the domestic monetary policy shock
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Figure 6: Responses to an impulse on the foreign monetary policy shock
An interpretation of the results that can be derived from Figures 1 to 6 can be found in the following.
1. The domestic output gap, PPI in°ation and nominal interest rates decrease before they return to
their zero-in°ation steady-state values in response to an impulse on the domestic productivity shock
(Figure 1). The TOT ¯rst augment, then drop below their zero-in°ation steady-state value until
they eventually converge. There is also an impact on all foreign endogenous variables, which is of
the same sign except for the foreign PPI and nominal interest rates. Nonetheless, this impact is
quantitatively small and induces °uctuations.
2. The foreign output gap, PPI in°ation and nominal interest rates decrease before they return to
their zero-in°ation steady-state values in response to an impulse on the foreign productivity shock
(Figure 2). The TOT ¯rst augment, then drop to their zero-in°ation steady-state value. There is
also an impact on all domestic endogenous variables, which barely °uctuate. The impact is of the
same sign but quantitatively larger compared to the impact of the domestic productivity shock on
foreign variables. In addition, the US recovers notably faster from a shock on its own productivity
compared to the EU.
3. The domestic output gap decreases, yet the domestic PPI in°ation and nominal interest rates in-
crease before all endogenous variables return to their zero-in°ation steady-state values in response
to an impulse on the cost-push shocks (Figure 3). The TOT ¯rst plummet, then jump above their
zero-in°ation steady-state value until they eventually converge. There is also an impact on all for-
eign endogenous variables, which is of the same sign except for the foreign PPI and nominal interest
rates.
4. The foreign output gap decreases, yet the foreign PPI in°ation and nominal interest rates increase
before all endogenous variables return to their zero-in°ation steady-state values in response to an
impulse on the cost-push shocks (Figure 4). The TOT ¯rst augment, then drop below their zero-
in°ation steady-state value until they eventually converge. There is also an impact on all domestic
endogenous variables, which is of the same sign except for the foreign PPI and nominal interest rates.
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5. The domestic output gap, PPI in°ation and nominal interest rates decrease before all endogenous
variables return to their zero-in°ation steady-state values in response to an impulse on the monetary
policy shocks (Figure 5). The TOT augment before they return to their zero-in°ation steady-state
value. There is also an impact on all foreign endogenous variables, which is of the same sign.
6. The foreign output gap, PPI in°ation and nominal interest rates decrease before all endogenous
variables return to their zero-in°ation steady-state values in response to an impulse on the monetary
policy shocks (Figure 6). The TOT plummet before they return to their zero-in°ation steady-state
value. There is also an impact on all domestic endogenous variables, which is of the same sign.
Except for the aggregate productivity shocks, the deviation of the domestic output gap from the zero-
in°ation steady state is higher than the one of the foreign output gap in case of home-made disturbances.
However, the picture is ambiguous in case of PPI in°ation and nominal interest rates. As expected, none
of the shocks discussed above is able to raise output above its °exible-price equilibrium level, neither at
home nor abroad. Instead, output in both countries drops in response to all entailed impulses before it
eventually converges.
The negative in°uence of the productivity shocks on the economy contradicts one of the central impli-
cations of the standard RBC model, namely a positive correlation of productivity (shocks) and output.
Findings for a closed-economy New Keynesian model, which are similar to the present results, are re-
ported, e.g., in Gal¶ ³ (2002, pp. 17-18). Empirical studies support this view and show in addition
that technology shocks do not seem to be a signi¯cant source for the creation of business cycles at all,
which contradicts another central implication of the standard RBC model, namely that technology shocks
ought to be the dominant driving force for the creation of business cycles (see Gal¶ ³/Rabanal 2004, pp.
36-39).
The subsequent property of the monetary policy shocks is also worth mentioning. Contrary to Corsetti/
Pesenti (2001, pp. 435-439), negative realizations of v;v¤, which correspond to expansionary shocks,
always have a "prosper thyself" and "beggar thy neighbor" e®ect since they in°uence the TOT bene¯cially
for the home (foreign) country's resident households by decreasing them below (raising them above) their
zero-in°ation steady-state values. In addition, this e®ect would induce a rise of both domestic and foreign
output above their °exible-price values.30
Finally, statistical moments, correlations, and autocorrelations of the simulated endogenous variables are
given in Tables 1 to 3 below.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Variance Skewness Kurtosis
x 0.074386 5.191024 26.946731 -0.075655 0.064088
x¤ -0.134416 3.104816 9.639881 -0.108630 -0.065179
¼H -0.019727 1.537767 2.364727 0.026293 -0.077795
¼¤
F 0.083086 2.605910 6.790766 0.059946 -0.110862
¢t -0.025646 2.154687 4.642675 0.036449 -0.037179
^ i -0.034227 1.743373 3.039349 0.039592 0.133487
^ i¤ 0.094419 2.515244 6.326453 0.084558 -0.102184
Table 1: Moments of simulated variables
30Note, however, that monetary policy shocks in Corsetti/Pesenti (2001) are modeled in terms of permanent and unex-
pected changes in money supply.
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Variable x x¤ ¼H ¼¤
F ¢t ^ i ^ i¤
x 1.0000 0.0566 -0.4303 -0.0157 -0.1783 -0.7667 -0.0062
x¤ 0.0566 1.0000 0.0413 -0.8503 -0.2025 0.0165 -0.8834
¼H -0.4303 0.0413 1.0000 -0.0426 -0.1487 0.8980 -0.0501
¼¤
F -0.0157 -0.8503 -0.0426 1.0000 0.3056 -0.0308 0.9894
¢t -0.1783 -0.2025 -0.1487 0.3056 1.0000 0.0099 0.2668
^ i -0.7667 0.0165 0.8980 -0.0308 0.0099 1.0000 -0.0407
^ i¤ -0.0062 -0.8834 -0.0501 0.9894 0.2668 -0.0407 1.0000
Table 2: Correlation of simulated variables
Variable t ¡ 1 t ¡ 2 t ¡ 3 t ¡ 4 t ¡ 5
x 0.7948 0.6069 0.4625 0.3513 0.2574
x¤ 0.7944 0.6279 0.5004 0.3857 0.2957
¼H 0.8091 0.6536 0.5277 0.4337 0.3558
¼¤
F 0.7941 0.6264 0.4935 0.3789 0.2852
¢t 0.0887 0.0285 -0.0018 0.0046 0.0046
^ i 0.8173 0.6288 0.4808 0.3745 0.2857
^ i¤ 0.8008 0.6337 0.4981 0.3878 0.2952
Table 3: Autocorrelation of simulated variables
As one can see from Table 1, the explanation why for almost any impulse the deviation of x is notably
higher than of x¤ may be found in the di®ering interest-rate rules for the ECB (60) and the Fed (61). The
positive and ¯xed sensitivity of the Fed to the current US output gap may ceteris paribus absorb part
of the impulses transmitted through the system of equations (63). This additional channel constitutes
a dampening e®ect to any exogenous disturbance, which does not exist for the EU by assumption. In
consequence, the simulated variance of the domestic output gap ~ ¾2
x is almost three times as high as the










On the contrary, the simulated variance of the foreign PPI in°ation rate ~ ¾2
¼¤
F is almost three times as











This means that if the ECB implemented its monetary policy by following the interest-rate rule (60),
sustaining price stability, which is its primary objective according to its statute, would be better attainable
than if, e.g., it were using an interest-rate rule as proposed for the Fed (61) instead. Nonetheless, this
advantage can only be reached at the expense of relatively high °uctuations in the EU output gap, which
is a trade-o® commonly observed in literature on monetary policy.
Notice that again the above results have been derived for a calibrated version of the two-country DSGE
model only so that they may not necessarily be universally applicable.
8. Concluding Remarks
The main results of the present article have already been stated in the introductory Section 1 such that
there is no need to repeat them once more at this point. However, one might be interested in possible
extensions and applications of the present model to be dealt with by future research.
In line with Obstfeld/Rogoff (2001, pp. 37-38) and as mentioned in Section 4, one could enrich this
model, e.g., by introducing government spending (shocks). Or one could try and implement optimal mon-
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etary policy into the framework. Another possibility would be to alter the speci¯cation and correlation
patterns of the various macroeconomic shocks. As already stated in Section 2, Gal¶ ³ (2008) gives various
suggestions on how to extend a basic closed-economy New Keynesian model. Out of these suggestions we
¯nd that introducing labor market frictions, migration, and unemployment, imperfect information and
learning, or the use of real capital as additional production factor would be particularly appealing (see
Gal¶ ³ 2008, pp. 188-190).
An immediate application of the present framework, however, would be an empirical one. Similar to
Rubaszek/Skrzypczynski (2008) who treat the US as a closed economy, one could test the forecasting
performance of this model against an unconstrained vector autoregressive (VAR) model while using the
same data.
A. Appendix
A.1. Consumption-based Consumer and Producer Price Indexes, Demand Curves
for Individual and Composite Goods
The derivation of all price indexes and demand curves follows the ideas in Obstfeld/Rogoff (1996,
pp. 662, 664) for the basic Obstfeld/Rogoff (1995) model.








with respect to CH subject to the budget constraint


















nn(1 ¡ n)1¡n ¡ ¸PH = 0:





















with PHCH = nPC. Now combine the preceding equation with the preliminary demand function from








Analogously, one gets for CF equation (13):






























































































µ ¡ ¸P(h) = 0:














































































0 P(h)C(h)dh = PHCH. Now combine the preceding equation with the preliminary demand
function from above. Then one gets for C(h):
C(h) = P(h)¡µ PHCH R n
0 P(h)1¡µdh
:




























































A.2. First Order Conditions for a Utility Maximum




































































































































































From the ¯rst partial derivative one obtains C
¡½
t = ¡¸t and therefore C
¡½
t+1 = ¡¸t+1. Plugging this into












Now, by using C
¡½
t = ¡¸t and C
¡½



























A.3. Equilibrium Conditions on World Bond and Goods Markets
The subsequent derivation is based on Obstfeld/Rogoff (2001, pp. 7-9), which itself is based on
reasoning by Corsetti/Pesenti (2001, pp. 430-433).
Start with the market clearing condition for a single good z:
Yt(z) = nCt(z) + (1 ¡ n)C¤
t (z):
Assuming, for instance, that good z is a typical domestic good such that z = h 2 [0;n] and multiplying
the preceding equation with Pt(h) one obtains:
Pt(h)Yt(h) = nPt(h)Ct(h) + (1 ¡ n)Pt(h)C¤
t (h):
Taking the integral from 0 to n and using equations (6) and (10) yields:
Z n
0
Pt(h)Yt(h)dh = nPt;HCt;H + (1 ¡ n)Pt;HC¤
t;H:
Because of equations (12) and (14) this expression implies:
Z n
0
Pt(h)Yt(h)dh = n2PtCt + (1 ¡ n)nPtC¤
t = nPtCw
t ;
where the right-hand side of the above equation denotes global demand for domestic goods in domestic
currency. Since Y denotes domestic per-capita output, the left-hand side of the equation can alternatively
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Note that the equilibrium condition on the world market for foreign goods (27) can be derived analo-
gously.













Furthermore, substituting equation (22) for the household's instantaneous pro¯ts into the intertemporal
budget constraint (17) we get:
(1 + it¡1)Bt¡1 + Mt¡1 + Pt(h)Yt(h) = PtCt + Mt + Bt + Pt¿t:
Integrating from 0 to n and using
R n
0 Pt(h)Yt(h)dh = nPt;HYt one obtains:
(1 + it¡1)Bt¡1 + Mt¡1 + Pt;HYt = PtCt + Mt + Bt + Pt¿t:
Due to the government's budget constraint (36) the preceding equation rearranges to the domestic balance
of payments identity (29):
Pt;HYt ¡ PtCt + it¡1Bt¡1 ´ Bt ¡ Bt¡1:
Note that the foreign balance of payments identity (30) can be derived analogously.
A.4. Dynamic IS Curves
First rewrite the domestic Euler equation for real consumption (18) as follows:
C
¡½




















The non-stochastic zero-in°ation steady-state version of this equations reads as follows:
(¹ Tn¡1 ¹ Y )¡½ = ¯(1 +¹ i) ¹ P
(¹ Tn¡1 ¹ Y )¡½
¹ P
:



















(¹ Tn¡1 ¹ Y )¡½ :
By taking the natural logarithm of this ratio, one obtains:
¡½[(n¡1)tt +yt ¡(n¡1)¹ t¡ ¹ y] = ln(1+it)¡ln(1+¹ i)+pt ¡Et[pt+1]¡½f(n¡1)Et[tt+1]+Et[yt+1]g+½[(n¡1)¹ t+ ¹ y]:
Note that ln(1 + it) ¼ it and ln(1 +¹ i) ¼ ¹ i. Moreover, the approximation lnEt[ªt+1] ¼ Et[ªt+1] ¡ 1 =
Et[ªt+1 ¡1] ¼ Et[lnªt+1] = EtÃt+1 assures for the exchangeability of the ln and expectations operators
for a generic random variable ª.
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Subsequently, Et[¼t+1] := Et[pt+1]¡pt shall be de¯ned as the expected CPI in°ation rate in period t+1.
In addition, let hatted variables denote the percentage deviations from their zero-in°ation steady-state
values (^ yt := yt ¡ ¹ y;Et[^ yt+1] := Et[yt+1] ¡ ¹ y;^ it := it ¡¹ i).
Taking this into account and cancelling the term ½(n ¡ 1)¹ t on both sides, the last equation rearranges
to:
¡½(n ¡ 1)tt ¡ ½yt + ½¹ y =^ it ¡ Et[¼t+1] ¡ ½(n ¡ 1)Et[tt+1] ¡ ½Et[yt+1] + ½¹ y:
Solving this for ^ yt, one ¯nally obtains the domestic dynamic IS curve (39):
^ yt = Et[^ yt+1] +
1
½
fEt[¼t+1] ¡^ itg ¡ (1 ¡ n)Et[¢tt+1]:
Note that the foreign dynamic IS curve (40) can be derived analogously.
A.5. New Keynesian Phillips Curves
In period t, a domestic producer willing to reset her price maximizes her expected discounted future




















t )¡½ is a stochastic discount factor, which denotes the marginal rate of substitution of real
(world) consumption between periods s and t. Note that here one has made use of equation (23). In case
of goods market clearing output of an individual producer equals global demand for the di®erentiated
good (Y (h) = Cw(h)). Note further that the condition Pt(h) = Ps(h) during the length of the contract

















































































































Now consider the case where everybody resets their prices (± = 0). As each producer charges the same



















t;H = (1 ¡ ±)Pt(h)1¡µ + ±P
1¡µ
t¡1;H:
Log-linearizing the preceding formula around the zero-in°ation steady-state price level ¹ PH yields the
following percentage deviations:
^ pt;H = (1 ¡ ±)^ pt(h) + ±^ pt¡1;H:






































where Qt := Pt(h)=Pt;H.
If one log-linearizes this equation around the zero-in°ation steady-state, one ¯nally obtains the subsequent


















(±¯)s¡t( ¹ Cw)1¡½[(1 ¡ ½)^ cw

















(±¯)s¡t( ¹ Cw)1¡½[(1 ¡ ½)^ cw
s + Et[^ ·s] + µ(Et[^ ps;H] ¡ ^ pt;H) + (¡1)(Et[^ ps;H] ¡ Et[^ ps])]
)
;
where most of the terms cancel out.
Solving the remainder for ^ qt + ^ pt;H, one gets:
^ qt + ^ pt;H = (1 ¡ ±¯)
1 X
s=t
(±¯)s¡tfEt[^ ps;H] + Et[^ ·s]g
= (1 ¡ ±¯)(^ pt;H + ^ ·t) + ±¯fEt[^ qt+1] + Et[^ pt+1;H]g
, ^ qt = (1 ¡ ±¯)^ ·t + ±¯fEt[^ qt+1] + Et[¼t+1;H]g;
where Et[¼t+1;H] := Et[^ pt+1;H] ¡ ^ pt;H. Due to ^ qt := ^ pt(h) ¡ ^ pt;H and ^ pt(h) = [1=(1 ¡ ±)]^ pt;H ¡ [±=(1 ¡
±)]^ pt¡1;H, it follows that ^ qt = [±=(1 ¡ ±)]¼t;H. Plugging this result into the above equation one ¯nally
obtains the domestic NKPC (42):
¼t;H = ¯Et[¼t+1;H] +
(1 ¡ ±)(1 ¡ ±¯)
±
^ ·t:
Note that the foreign NKPC (43) can be derived analogously.
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A.6. Dynare Program Code for Matlab
periods 1000;
var x_d x_f pi_d pi_f t i_d i_f a_d a_f u_d u_f v_d v_f;
varexo e_af e_ad e_ud e_uf e_vd e_vf;
parameters ALPHA_D ALPHA_F MU_D MU_F OMEGA_D OMEGA_F THETA_D THETA_F IOTA_F XI RHO
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